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Case Note
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT—The Going and Coming
Rule: Drawing an Untenable Line in the Sand; In re Worker’s
Compensation Claim of Barlow, 259 P.3d 1170 (Wyo. 2011)
Michael J. Fitzgerald *
Introduction
Every day in Wyoming vehicles travel more than 25,000,000 miles.1 Per
capita, Wyomingites drive almost twice as many miles as compared to the
national average.2 Undoubtedly, many of those miles involve employees traveling
for employment related reasons.3 When injuries occur in those situations the
Wyoming Worker’s Compensation Act (WWCA) may apply.4 Under the WWCA,
an employee’s injuries are not generally compensable if the injuries occurred when
going to or coming from his or her place of employment.5 This rule of law is
known as the going and coming rule.6 Wyoming recognizes two exceptions to the
* Candidate for J.D., University of Wyoming, 2014. I would like to thank Julianne Gern,
Professor Michael C. Duff, and I would also like to thank Anne Kugler, Joshua Eames, Christopher
Sherwood, and the rest of the Wyoming Law Review Editorial Board for their guidance and support
in writing this case note.
1
Wyo. Dep’t Transp., 2011–2012 Wyoming Transportation Facts 15 (2012), available at
http://www.dot.state.wy.us/files/content/sites/wydot/files/shared/Management_Services/Fact%20
Book/factbook%202011-12_opt.pdf.
2
Id. at 14. In January, 2011, Wyomingites drove 16,976 miles per capita as compared to the
national average of 9,566 miles per capita. Id.
3
See Commuting In Wyoming First Quarter 2005 to Third Quarter 2011, Wyo. Dep’t of
Workforce Servs., http://doe.state.wy.us/lmi/commute/2012/default.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2012).

See generally Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 27-14-101 to -806 (2012). In its original enactment, the
worker’s compensation act was called the Workmen’s Compensation Law. 1915 Wyo. Sess. Laws
175–76. However, in 1975 the Wyoming Legislature amended the name of the act to the Wyoming
Worker’s Compensation Act. 1975 Wyo. Sess. Laws 222.
4

5
See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(D) (2012) (“‘Injury’ does not include: . . . [a]ny
injury sustained during travel to or from employment unless the employee is reimbursed for travel
expenses or is transported by the vehicle of the employer.”).
6
In re Worker’s Comp. Claim of Barlow, 259 P.3d 1170, 1173 (Wyo. 2011) (quoting
Archuleta v. Carbon Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 787 P.2d 91, 92 (Wyo. 1990)) (“This statute is the
codification of a concept known as the ‘going and coming’ rule, which is based on ‘a long-standing
common law rule that injuries incurred while either going to or coming from work are not
compensable unless the employer has in some fashion provided the employee with transportation or
has reimbursed him for the costs of those travels.’”). For an explanation from what is generally known
to be the authoritative guide on workers’ compensation law, see Lex K. Larson, Larson’s Workers’
Compensation, Desk Edition § 13.01[1] (Matthew Bender ed., rev. ed. 2012) (“The course of
employment is not confined to the actual manipulation of the tools of the work, nor to the exact
hours of work. On the other hand, while admittedly, the employment is the cause of the worker’s
journey between home and factory, it is generally taken for granted that workers’ compensation
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going and coming rule.7 The two exceptions are the “reimbursement exception”
and the “conveyance exception.” 8 Furthermore, if the injuries occur on the
premises of the employer then the injuries may be compensable according to the
“injury rule.” 9
In In re Worker’s Compensation Claim of Barlow, James W. Barlow suffered a
knee injury when he slipped while climbing into his pickup truck to travel to a
series of distant meetings as part of his employment.10 His employer provided the
pickup truck for both personal and employment related travel.11 The issue was
whether Barlow suffered a compensable injury as defined under the WWCA.12
The Wyoming Workers’ Safety and Compensation Division denied Barlow’s claim
for compensation benefits.13 The Office of Administrative Hearings dismissed
Barlow’s claim on summary judgment.14 The district court affirmed.15 Ultimately,
a majority of the Wyoming Supreme Court upheld the lower decisions, concluding
that “an injury sustained during travel is only compensable if it occurs as the
claimant is being carried or conveyed from one place to another (i.e. sitting in the
vehicle and moving from one place to another).”16

was not intended to protect against all the perils of that journey.”). For further discussion of the
going and coming rule, see generally Nathaniel R. Boulton, Establishing Causation in Iowa Workers’
Compensation Law, 59 Drake L. Rev. 463, 478 (2011) (“Generally, injuries sustained while an
employee is traveling to or from work are not compensable because they are not considered to
have been in the course of employment.”); 82 Am. Jur. 2d Worker’s Compensation § 269 (2012)
(discussing the going and coming rule).
7

See § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(D).

See id.; e.g., In re Jensen, 178 P.2d 897, 907 (Wyo. 1947) (discussing the conveyance
exception); Berg v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety and Comp. Div., 106 P.3d 867, 871 (Wyo.
2005) (discussing the application of the reimbursement exception).
8

9
Under section 27-14-102(a)(xi), or the “injury rule” for the purposes of this case note,
injuries occurring on the premises of the employer may be compensable if there is a causal nexus
between the injury and the employment regardless of whether or not the elements of the “premises
rule” can be established. See § 27-14-102(a)(xi); Finley v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety and
Comp. Div., 132 P.3d 185, 188–89 (Wyo. 2006) (discussing injuries occurring on the employer
premises); Archuleta v. Carbon Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 787 P.2d 91, 94 (Wyo. 1990) (discussing the
premises rule within the context of the going and coming rule); State ex rel. Wyo. Worker’s Comp.
Div. v. Miller, 787 P.2d 89, 90 (Wyo. 1990); In re Injury to Corean, 723 P.2d 58, 60 (Wyo. 1986)
(discussing injuries occurring on the employer premises when the employee is going to or coming
from the employment).
10

Barlow, 259 P.3d at 1172.

11

Id.

12

Id.

13

Id.

14

Id.

Brief of Appellee, Wyo. Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div. at 10, Barlow, 259 P.3d 1170 (No.
S-10-0243) [hereinafter Brief of Appellee].
15

16

Barlow, 259 P.3d at 1175.
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The Wyoming Supreme Court decided Barlow incorrectly for three reasons.
First, the interpretation of the rule articulated in Barlow leads to an absurd result
by excluding compensable injuries under the conveyance exception and should not
be followed.17 Instead, the Wyoming Supreme Court should adhere to the causal
nexus test.18 Second, the majority could have found Barlow’s injuries compensable
under the reimbursement exception.19 Finally, Barlow’s injuries could have been
compensable under the WWCA by considering the vehicle as the premises of
his employer.20

Background
The Wyoming Worker’s Compensation Act
The Wyoming Legislature enacted the WWCA after an amendment to
the Wyoming Constitution.21 The WWCA abolished common law causes of
action for injuries suffered by employees against employers in favor of providing
compensation from a fund comprised of payments made by employers.22 Causes
of action under the WWCA are contractual in nature.23 Therefore, the purpose
of the WWCA is to provide compensation for injured employees regardless of
fault.24 In the first eighty-nine years of its enactment the Wyoming Supreme
Court applied a liberal construction of the WWCA in favor of finding injuries
compensable.25 However, in 1994 the Wyoming Legislature amended the intent
17

See infra notes 157–85 and accompanying text.

18

See infra notes 182–85 and accompanying text.

19

See infra notes 186–203 and accompanying text

20

See infra notes 204–41 and accompanying text.

George Santini, The Breaking of a Compromise: An Analysis of Wyoming Worker’s Compensation
Legislation, 1986-1997, 33 Land & Water L. Rev. 489, 489 (1998); see Wyo. Const. Art. 10, § 4;
1915 Wyo. Sess. Laws 175–76.
21

Santini, supra note 21, at 489; see Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-104(a) (2012) (“The rights
and remedies provided in this act for an employee . . . for injuries incurred in extrahazardous
employments are in lieu of all other rights and remedies against any employer . . . making
contributions required by this act.”). See generally Timothy R. Hancock, Comment, Apportionment
Between Preexisting Conditions and Work-Related Injuries: Why Wyoming Needs a Second Injury Fund,
11 Wyo. L. Rev. 525, 527–28 (2011) (discussing compensation under the WWCA).
22

Perry v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div., 134 P.3d 1242, 1249 (Wyo.
2006) (citing Spera v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Comp. Div. (In re Injury to Spera), 713 P.2d 1155,
1156 (Wyo. 1986)) (“Thus, the worker’s compensation system is not a tort-based system but is,
instead, based upon contract.”).
23

24

See id.

See, e.g., Archuleta v. Carbon Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 787 P.2d 91, 92 (Wyo. 1990) (citing
Deloges v. State ex rel. Wyo. Worker’s Comp. Div., 750 P.2d 1329, 1331 (Wyo. 1988)) (“In applying
that definition of ‘injury,’ we are guided by the oft-stated principle that the act should be liberally
construed to afford coverage wherever that may be accomplished without unreasonably extending
the clear language of the statutes.”); Randell v. Wyo. State Treasurer ex rel. Wyo. Worker’s Comp.
Div., 671 P.2d 303, 309 (Wyo. 1983); In re Jensen, 178 P.2d 897, 907 (Wyo. 1947) (“We are not
25
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statement of the WWCA and abolished the practice of liberally construing
the act.26
The WWCA prescribes certain requirements for an employee to receive
compensation benefits.27 Initially, an employee must file an application for benefits
with the Division of Workers’ Safety and Compensation of the Department of
Workforce Services.28 In this application, an employee must show that he or she
suffered a compensable injury.29 An employee must establish the seven statutory
elements of a compensable injury.30 First, there must be a “harmful change in the
human organism.”31 Second, the injury must occur “while at work.”32 Third, the
place must be “used or controlled by the employer.”33 Fourth, the injury must
occur “in or about the premises occupied.”34 Fifth, the injury must occur “in
places where the employer’s business requires an employee’s presence.”35 Sixth,
the employment must “subject[] the employee to extrahazardous duties incident
to the business.”36 Finally, the injury must “aris[e] out of and in the course of
unmindful that a few courts have taken a strict and as we think too narrow a view of the phrase ‘in
the course of employment’ but having regard to the purposes of the law and the liberal construction
thereof which we have consistently followed for many years and which the legislature of the state has
never disapproved, we are not inclined to adopt such a view at this late date.”).
26
See 1994 Wyo. Sess. Laws 286; see also Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-101 (2012) (“[T]he
legislature declares that the Worker’s Compensation Act . . . is not to be given a broad liberal
construction in favor of any party.”); Santini, supra note 21, at 514 (discussing the adoption of
the amended statement of intent that abandoned the liberal construction practice and the negative
effect on compensation).
27

See infra notes 28–39 and accompanying text.

28

025-220-005 Wyo. Code R. § 4 (LexisNexis 2012).

29

In re Worker’s Comp. Claim of Barlow, 259 P.3d 1170, 1172 (Wyo. 2011).

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi) (2012); Finley v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety
& Comp. Div., 132 P.3d 185, 188 (Wyo. 2006) (citing Hanks v. City of Casper, 16 P.3d 710, 711
(Wyo. 2001); Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Borchert, 994 P.2d 959, 963 (Wyo. 2000); Thornberg v.
State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Comp. Div. (In re Worker’s Comp. Claim of Thornberg), 913 P.2d 863,
866 (Wyo. 1996)). “Injury” is defined under the WWCA as:
30

[A]ny harmful change in the human organism other than normal aging and
includes damage to or loss of any artificial replacement and death, arising out of
and in the course of employment while at work in or about the premises occupied,
used or controlled by the employer and incurred while at work in places where the
employer’s business requires an employee’s presence and which subjects the employee
to extrahazardous duties incident to the business.
§ 27-14-102(a)(xi).
31
See § 27-14-102(a)(xi). This element is limited further by the statutory language, “other
than normal aging and includes damage to or loss of any artificial replacement and death.” See id.
32

See id.

33

See id.

34

See id.

35

See id.

36

See id.
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employment.”37 Additionally, injuries under the WWCA are limited by certain
enumerated exceptions, including the going and coming rule.38 The going and
coming rule provides, “‘Injury’ does not include . . . [a]ny injury sustained
during travel to or from employment unless the employee is reimbursed for travel
expenses or is transported by a vehicle of the employer.”39
The Division of Worker’s Safety and Compensation reviews the application
for benefits and may either request additional information or make a final
determination.40 A party may object to the final determination within fifteen
days by filing a request for a hearing.41 If a request for a hearing is filed the case
is transferred to the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).42 An adversarial
adjudication will then be held before a presiding officer of the OAH subject
to the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act.43 The presiding officer of the
OAH will then make a final decision of the case.44 Pursuant to the Wyoming
Administrative Procedure Act and Rule 12 of the Wyoming Rules of Appellate
Procedure an aggrieved party may appeal the final decision of the OAH for review
to the district court in the county where the aggrieved party resides.45 Finally, an
37

See id.

38

See § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(D).

See id.; see also In re Worker’s Comp. Claim of Barlow, 259 P.3d 1170, 1173 (quoting
Archuleta v. Carbon Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 787 P.2d 91, 92 (Wyo. 1990)) (“This statute is the
codification of a concept known as the ‘going and coming’ rule, which is based on ‘a long-standing
common law rule that injuries incurred while either going to or coming from work are not
compensable unless the employer has in some fashion provided the employee with transportation or
has reimbursed him for the costs of those travels.’”).
39

40

025-220-005 Wyo. Code R. § 4(a) (LexisNexis 2012).

41

Id. § 4(e).

025-220-006 Wyo. Code R. § 1(a) (LexisNexis 2012). A request for hearing may also be
transferred to the Worker’s Compensation Medical Commission if appropriate. Id.
42

43
See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-107 (2012); 270-000-003 Wyo. Code R. §§ 1–5 (LexisNexis
2012). See generally Nancy D. Freudenthal & Roger C. Fransen, Administrative Law: Rulemaking
and Contested Case Practice in Wyoming, 31 Land & Water L. Rev. 685, 698–709 (1996) (discussing
contested case practice under the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act).
44

270-000-003 Wyo. Code R. § 6 (LexisNexis 2012).

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114 (2012); 270-000-004 Wyo. Code R. § 1 (LexisNexis
2012); Wyo. R. App. P. 12.1. Section 16-3-114(c) provides:
45

To the extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing
court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory
provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency
action. In making the following determinations, the court shall review the whole
record or those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of the rule
of prejudicial error. The reviewing court shall:
(i)

Compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed;
and

(ii) Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions
found to be:
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aggrieved party may appeal the final decision of the district court to the Wyoming
Supreme Court.46

The Going and Coming Rule
Generally, the going and coming rule denies worker’s compensation benefits
to employees who suffer injuries while traveling to or from work.47 In 1915,
the Wyoming Legislature codified the going and coming rule.48 The original
language of the statute did not include any exceptions and remained substantively
unchanged until 1971.49 When the Wyoming Legislature amended the statute in
1971 the revised legislation failed to include the going and coming rule.50 The

(A) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise
not in accordance with law;
(B) Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or
immunity;
(C) In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations
or lacking statutory right;
(D) Without observance of procedure required by law; or
(E) Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on
the record of an agency hearing provided by statute.
For further discussion, see generally Freudenthal & Fransen, supra note 43, at 704–05 (discussing
challenging an agency’s finding after a hearing).
46
Wyo. R. App. P. 12.11(a) (“An aggrieved party may obtain review of any final judgment of
the district court by appeal to the supreme court.”).
47
See Larson, supra note 6 (discussing the basic going and coming rule within worker’s
compensation). See generally Henry Slowik, Note, California’s Going and Coming Rule in Workers’
Compensation: A New Model for Consistency, 36 Hastings L.J. 969, 973–75 (1985) (discussing the
going and coming rule within worker’s compensation).
48
1915 Wyo. Sess. Laws 175–76 (“The words ‘injuries sustained in extra-hazardous
employment,’ as used in this chapter . . . shall not include injuries of the employee occurring while
on his way to assume the duties of his employment or after leaving such duties . . . .”); In re Worker’s
Comp. Claim of Barlow, 295 P.3d 1170, 1173 (Wyo. 2011) (discussing the codification of the going
and coming rule).
49
See Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 4321(l) (1920); Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 124-106-7 (l) (1931); Wyo.
Comp. Stat. § 72-106 (1945); Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 27-49(III)(a) (1957); 1971 Wyo. Sess. Laws
359–60; Barlow, 295 P.3d at 1173.
50

1971 Wyo. Sess. Laws 359–60. The statute defined injury as:
The words “injury and personal injury” shall not include injury caused by the
willful act of a third person directed against an employee for reasons personal to
such employee, or because of his employment; nor a disease, except that which shall
directly result from an injury incurred in the employment and except as is provided
in the Occupational Disease Law; and further that the words “injury and personal
injury” shall be construed only to mean an injury or injury directly and solely caused
by a traumatic accident in the employment.

Id.
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going and coming rule remained absent from the statutory language until 1986.51
Nonetheless, the Wyoming Supreme Court continued to apply the rule and
its exceptions.52
In 1986, the Wyoming Legislature reinstated the going and coming rule.53
Unlike the original language, the new going and coming rule included express
exceptions.54 The Wyoming going and coming rule now provides that “[a]ny
injury sustained during travel to or from employment” is not compensable “unless
the employee is reimbursed for travel expenses or is transported by a vehicle of the
employer.” 55 Thus section 27-14-102(a)(xi)(D) contains two express exceptions
to the going and coming rule, the “conveyance exception” and the “reimburse
ment exception.”56

Statutory Interpretation of the Wyoming Worker’s Compensation Act
Statutory interpretation plays a significant role in determining the application
of the going and coming rule under the WWCA. Under Wyoming law if a statute
is clear and unambiguous then the ordinary and plain language is given effect,
making it unnecessary to resort to rules of statutory construction.57 The Wyoming
Supreme Court articulated the test for determining when a statute is ambiguous:
“A statute is clear and unambiguous if its wording is such that reasonable persons
are able to agree on its meaning with consistency and predictability. Conversely, a
statute is ambiguous if it is found to be vague or uncertain and subject to varying
interpretations.”58 Furthermore, the Wyoming Supreme Court has “recognized
that divergent opinions among parties as to the meaning of a statute may be

51
Compare Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-12-102(xii) (1971) (failing to include the going and coming
rule), with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(xi)(D) (1987) (including the going and coming rule).
52
See In re Willey, 571 P.2d 248, 251 (Wyo. 1977) (citations omitted) (“This court subscribes
to the almost universal rule that generally injuries sustained by an employee who is ‘going to or
coming from’ the duties of his employment are not covered by worker’s compensation. In fact,
this rule was a part of the statutory definition of ‘injury’ until the recodification of the worker’s
compensation laws . . . .”).
53

1986 Wyo. Spec. Sess. Laws 7.

Compare 1915 Wyo. Sess. Laws 175–76 (containing no express exceptions), with 1986
Wyo. Spec. Sess. Laws 7 (containing express exceptions).
54

55

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(D) (2012); accord 1986 Wyo. Spec. Sess. Laws 7.

56

See § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(D).

In re Estate of Johnson, 231 P.3d 873, 878 (Wyo. 2010) (quoting BP Am. Prod. Co. v.
Dep’t of Revenue, 112 P.3d 596, 604 (Wyo. 2005)). See generally Debora A. Person, Legislative
Histories and the Practice of Statutory Interpretation in Wyoming, 10 Wyo. L. Rev. 559, 565–66
(2010) (discussing the Wyoming Supreme Court’s approach to ambiguity in statutes).
57

Office of State Lands & Invs. v. Mule Shoe Ranch, Inc., 252 P.3d 951, 955 (Wyo. 2011)
(quoting Dorr v. Smith, Keller & Assocs., 238 P.3d 549, 552 (Wyo. 2010)).
58
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evidence of ambiguity but is not conclusive.”59 If a statute is ambiguous then
the court will apply the rules of statutory construction.60 Ultimately, if an
interpretation of a statute leads to absurd results then that interpretation will not
be followed.61
Prior to Barlow, the Wyoming Supreme Court determined the language
of section 27-14-102(a)(xi)(D) to be unambiguous.62 In Lloyd v. State ex rel.
Wyoming Workers’ Safety and Compensation Division, Lloyd argued that common
law exceptions to the going and coming rule applied regardless of the language of
the statute.63 The State argued that the adoption of section 27-14-102(a)(xi)(D)
renounced the common law exceptions, except for the exceptions expressly
enumerated within the language of the statute.64 The Wyoming Supreme
Court agreed with the State and determined that section 27-14-102(a)(xi)(D)
is unambiguous in that it only contains the exceptions stated therein.65 In two
subsequent cases, the Wyoming Supreme Court reaffirmed that the language
contained in the going and coming rule was unambiguous.66 In Berg v. State
ex rel. Wyoming Workers’ Safety and Compensation Division, the issue before
the court was whether Berg was “reimbursed for travel expenses.”67 Citing
Lloyd for the proposition that the language of section 27-14-102(a)(xi)(D) is
unambiguous, the Wyoming Supreme Court interpreted the phrase to require
actual compensation for travel expenses.68 The court held that because Berg had
received no compensation for travel expenses, his injuries suffered during travel
were not compensable.69 In Quinn v. Securitas Security Services, the issue before
the court was whether the vehicle in which Quinn was injured was a “vehicle
of the employer.” 70 The Wyoming Supreme Court, again citing Lloyd, held that

59
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Dep’t. of Revenue, 154 P.3d 331, 335 (Wyo. 2007) (quoting RME
Petroleum Co. v. Wyo. Dep’t of Revenue, 150 P.3d 673, 683–84 (Wyo. 2007)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
60

Id.

Mule Shoe Ranch, Inc., 252 P.3d at 956 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 154 P.3d at 332). See
generally Leonard R. Carlman, Casenote, Wildlife-Private Property Damage Law, 29 Land & Water
L. Rev. 89, 109 (1994) (discussing an application of the absurd result doctrine).
61

62
Quinn v. Securitas Sec. Servs., 158 P.3d 711, 714 (Wyo. 2007); Berg v. State ex rel. Wyo.
Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div., 106 P.3d 867, 871 (Wyo. 2005); Lloyd v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’
Safety & Comp. Div., 93 P.3d 1001, 1004 (Wyo. 2004).
63

93 P.3d at 1005.

64

Id.

65

See id.

66

Berg, 106 P.3d at 871; Quinn, 158 P.3d at 714.

67

Berg, 106 P.3d at 871.

68

Id.

69

Id. at 871–72.

70

Quinn, 158 P.3d at 714–15 (“[T]he bus was not a ‘vehicle of the employer.’”).
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because Quinn’s employer had no control over the bus it was not a “vehicle of
the employer.” 71

The Causal Nexus Test
Section 27-14-102(a)(xi) of the WWCA provides, “‘Injury’ means any
harmful change in the human organism . . . arising out of and in the course of
employment.”72 In many jurisdictions the determination of whether an injury is
sufficiently connected to the employment and thus compensable under worker’s
compensation law depends on an interpretation of both the phrases “arising
out of ” and “in the course of employment.”73 The Wyoming Supreme Court,
however, has “construed ‘arising out of ’ employment to mean the same thing as
‘in the course of employment.’” 74 As a result, instead of applying the two phrases,
the Wyoming Supreme Court adopted the “causal nexus test” for determining
when injuries are compensable under the WWCA.75 The causal nexus test is a
“general test for compensability.”76 The court articulated the test as follows:
In either case, the injury is compensable if it arises out of and
in the course of employment. This requirement emphasizes
the need for a causal connection between the injury and the
employment. Such a causal connection is supplied when there
is a nexus between the injury and some condition, activity,
environment or requirement of the employment.77

71

Id.

72

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi) (2012) (emphasis added).

Larson, supra note 6, § 3.01 (“Few groups of statutory words in the history of law have
had to bear the weight of such a mountain of interpretation as has been heaped upon this slender
foundation.”); see, e.g., Quinn, 158 P.3d at 714; Archuleta v. Carbon Cnty. School Dis. No. 1, 787
P.2d 91, 92–93 (Wyo. 1990); In re Injury to Corean, 723 P.2d 58, 59–63 (Wyo. 1986) (citations
omitted) (“In a majority of the states, when an employee is hurt on the employer’s premises, it is
conclusively established under the premises rule that the employee was acting within the course of
his employment. This does not mean, however, that the worker is necessarily entitled to benefits.
He still must show that the harm arose out of his employment, i.e., was causally connected to his
employment.”); see also 2 Jon L. Gelman, Modern Workers Compensation § 110:2 (West 2012)
(discussing the single work-connectedness test of various jurisdictions, including Wyoming).
73

74

Corean, 723 P.2d at 60 (citing In re Willey, 571 P.2d 248, 250 (Wyo. 1977)).

Willey, 571 P.2d at 250; Corean, 723 P.2d at 61 (“Under the nexus test, we have developed
several clear rules and exceptions which dispose of most claims that arise out of accidents that
occur during travel to or from work.”). See generally Patricia Pattison & Philip E. Carca, Workers’
Compensation for Mental Stress Claims in Wyoming, 29 Land & Water L. Rev. 145, 151–52 (1994)
(discussing the causal connection requirement under the WWCA).
75

76
In re Worker’s Comp. Claim of Barlow, 259 P.3d 1170, 1176 (Wyo. 2011) (Burke,
J., dissenting).
77

Willey, 571 P.2d at 250 (citations omitted); accord Quinn, 158 P.3d at 714.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2013

9

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 13 [2013], No. 1, Art. 4

130

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 13

Thus, for an injury to be compensable under the WWCA, “there must be a
causal nexus between the injury and some condition, activity, environment or
requirement of the employment.”78 The Wyoming Supreme Court has applied
the causal nexus test to differentiate between compensable and non-compensable
injures under the WWCA generally.79

The Conveyance Exception
The language of section 27-14-102(a)(xi)(D) provides the “conveyance
exception” to the going and coming rule.80 Under the statute the conveyance
exception applies if an injury occurs “during travel to or from employment” and
“the employee . . . is transported by a vehicle of the employer.” 81 To satisfy the
conveyance exception, an injured employee must establish all of the elements of
a compensable injury and the elements of the conveyance exception.82 Generally,
“If the trip to and from work is made in a truck, bus, van, car, or other vehicle
under the control of the employer, an injury during that trip is incurred in the
course of employment.”83 The Wyoming Supreme Court applies the causal nexus
test to the conveyance exception to determine if the injury arises out of and in the
course of the employment.84 In Quinn v. Securitas Security Services, the Wyoming
Supreme Court stated the causal nexus test is satisfied under the conveyance
exception when “the employer has in some fashion provided the employee
with transportation.” 85

Barlow, 259 P.3d at 1177–76 (quoting Shelest v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety &
Comp. Div., 222 P.3d 167, 170 (Wyo. 2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
78

See, e.g., Anderson v. Solvay Minerals, 3 P.3d 236, 240 (Wyo. 2000) (discussing the
application of the causal nexus test to a mine accident); State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Comp. Div. v.
Espinoza, 924 P.2d 979, 981 (Wyo. 1996) (discussing the application of the causal nexus test to an
injury suffered by a restaurant employee due to horseplay); Baker v. Wendy’s of Mont., Inc., 687
P.2d 885, 891–92 (Wyo. 1984) (discussing the application of the causal nexus test to assaults and
batteries suffered at the workplace).
79

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(D) (2012). The language of § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(D)
also provides the reimbursement exception. See id.
80

81

Id.

82

See id.; supra notes 30–39 and accompanying text.

Larson, supra note 6, § 15.01[1] (discussing the conveyance exception); accord 99 C.J.S.
Workers’ Compensations § 440 (2012) (discussing the conveyance exception).
83

See, e.g., Quinn v. Securitas Sec. Servs., 158 P.3d 711, 714 (Wyo. 2007) (citing Berg v. State
ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div., 106 P.3d 867, 871 (Wyo. 2005); Archuleta v. Carbon
Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 787 P.2d 91, 92 (Wyo. 1990); In re Claims of Naylor, 723 P.2d 1237, 1241
(Wyo. 1986)) (“Those exceptions find a causal nexus where the employer has in some fashion
provided the employee with transportation . . . .”).
84

85

Id.
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The Reimbursement Exception
The language of section 27-14-102(a)(xi)(D) also provides the “reimburse
ment exception” to the going and coming rule.86 Under the statute, the
reimbursement exception applies when an injury occurs “during travel to or
from employment” and “the employee is reimbursed for travel expenses.” 87 To
satisfy the reimbursement exception, an injured employee must establish all of
the elements of a compensable injury and the elements of the reimbursement
exception.88 Generally, the reimbursement exception is a codification of “the
underlying principle that a journey is compensable if the making of that journey
is part of the service for which the employee is compensated.” 89 The Wyoming
Supreme Court has consistently employed the causal nexus test for determining
whether the injury suffered during travel arises out of and in the course of the
employment with regards to reimbursement.90 The Wyoming Supreme Court
determined that when an employer has assumed the cost of travel then injuries
suffered during that travel arise out of and in the course of the employment, or
in other words, satisfy the causal nexus test.91 Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law
provides that several factors may be considered when payment for travel is at issue:
(1) an employee may receive actual payment for the travel, (2) an employee may
be provided a vehicle as payment for the expense of travel, and (3) the length of
the journey itself if the journey “is a substantial part of the service performed.” 92

86
See § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(D); see also Larson, supra note 6, § 14.07 (discussing the reim
bursement exception). The language of § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(D) also provides the conveyance
exception. See § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(D).
87

§ 27-14-102(a)(xi)(D).

88

See id.; supra notes 30–39 and accompanying text.

Larson, supra note 6, § 14.06 (discussing payment for travel time); see also id. § 14.07
(discussing payment for travel expenses).
89

90
E.g., Quinn, 158 P.3d at 714; Berg, 106 P.3d at 871; Archuleta, 787 P.2d at 92; Naylor, 723
P.2d at 1241. But see In re Worker’s Comp. Claim of Barlow, 259 P.3d 1170, 1173–75 (Wyo. 2011)
(stating but failing to apply the causal nexus test).
91
See, e.g., Quinn, 158 P.3d at 714 (citing Berg, 106 P.3d at 871; Archuleta, 787 P.2d at
92; Naylor, 723 P.2d at 1241) (“Those exceptions find a causal nexus where the employer . . . has
reimbursed him for the costs of those travels.”).
92
See Larson, supra note 6, § 14.06 (discussing payment for travel time); see also id. § 14.07
(discussing payment for travel expenses); id. § 14.06[1] (citations omitted) (“When an employee
is paid an identifiable amount as compensation for time spent in a going and coming trip, the
trip is within the course of employment.”); id. § 14.07[1] (citations omitted) (“However, in the
majority of cases involving . . . the provision of an automobile under the employee’s control, the
journey is held to be in the course of employment.”); id. § 14.07[1] (“[W]hen the subject of the
transportation is singled out for special consideration it is normally because the transportation
involves a considerable distance, and therefore qualified under the rule herein suggested: that
employment should be deemed to include the travel when the travel itself is a substantial part of the
service performed.”).
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Injuries Occurring on the Premises of the Employer
The language of section 27-14-102(a)(xi) provides for the statutory basis
for finding injuries compensable when the injuries occur on the premises of the
employer.93 If the injury occurred on the premises of the employer, whether or
not the employee was coming to or going from the place of employment, then
the critical inquiry becomes whether the injury was causally connected to the
employment.94 Generally, an injury occurring on the employer’s premises, whether
or not the employee was going to or coming from work, is compensable only if
the injury satisfies the causal nexus test.95 Thus, the most significant element for

93
See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi); Finley v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety &
Comp. Div., 132 P.3d 185, 188–89 (Wyo. 2006) (discussing the element of “arising out of and in
the course of employment” with regards to injuries occurring on the premises of the employer);
Archuleta v. Carbon Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 787 P.2d 91, 94 (Wyo. 1990) (discussing the premises
rule within the context of the going and coming rule); State ex rel. Wyo. Worker’s Comp. Div. v.
Miller, 787 P.2d 89, 90 (Wyo. 1990); In re Injury to Corean, 723 P.2d 58, 60 (Wyo. 1986).
94
See, e.g., Finley, 123 P.3d at 188–89; Archuleta, 787 P.2d at 94; Corean, 723 P.2d at 61.
In Archuleta v. Carbon County School District No. 1, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that when
an injury occurs on the premises of the employer and the employee has fixed hours and a fixed
place of employment then a rebuttable presumption arises that the injury is causally connected
to the employment. 787 P.2d at 94. However, in Corean, a case predating Archuleta and never
overturned, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that the causal nexus test should be applied to all
injuries occurring on the premises of the employer when the injury occurs as the employee is going
to or coming from work. 723 P.2d at 60–61. Accordingly, while a rebuttable presumption of a
causal connection may arise if the employee had fixed hours and a fixed place of work, an injury
may still be causally connected to the employment without fixed hours and a fixed place of work.
See id.; e.g., Finley, 123 P.3d at 188–89 (discussing the application of Corean to an injury occurring
on the premises of the employer); Miller, 787 P.2d at 90 (citing Archuleta, 787 P.2d at 93) (“[W]e
explained that we had rejected the premises rule in Corean only to the extent that it was understood
to conclusively established a causal connection between on-premises injuries and employment. . . .
Accordingly, we adopted the rule as creating a rebuttable presumption of a causal nexus between
injury and employment.”). See generally Joseph A. Kalamarides, The Remote Site Doctrine in Alaska,
21 Alaska L. Rev. 289, 291–293 (2004) (discussing injuries occurring on the premises of the
employer and the requirement that injuries arise out of the employment).
95
See, e.g., Finley, 132 P.3d at 188 (“An employee-claimant in a worker’s compensation case
has the burden to prove all the statutory elements which comprise a compensable injury . . . . This
includes . . . proving that the injury arose out of and in the course of employment.”); In re Worker’s
Comp. Claim of Gomez, 231 P.3d 902, 906 (Wyo. 2010) (“To find Gomez’s death compensable
under these circumstances would require adoption of what would resemble a strict liability standard
for cases where an employee is on call and on the employer’s premises. That is not the law in
Wyoming, where compensability requires some “nexus” between the work and the injury, as the
citation above to Finley illustrates.”); Miller, 787 P.2d at 90 (“[W]e adopted the rule as creating a
rebuttable presumption of a causal nexus between injury and employment.”); Archuleta, 787 P.2d at
94 (“[W]e hold that where the elements of the premises rule . . . have been established, a rebuttable
presumption arises that the employee’s injury is causally connected to his employment.”); Corean,
723 P.2d at 61. See generally 99 C.J.S. Worker’s Compensation § 425 (2012) (discussing injuries
occurring on the premises of the employer); Mark Alan Johnson, Littlefield v. Pillsbury Co.: A Turn
to the Left in Worker’s Compensation, 46 Ohio St. L.J. 411, 415 (1985) (discussing the work related
requirement of injuries occurring on the premises of the employer).
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determining if an injury that occurs on the employer’s premises is compensable
is whether the injury “aris[es] out of and in the course of employment.” 96
Accordingly, if an injury occurs on the premises of the employer and all of the
elements of a compensable injury are satisfied then that injury is compensable
under the WWCA even if the employee was going to or coming from work.97
The Wyoming Supreme Court has never considered whether a vehicle may be
the “premises” of an employer.98 However, Larson’s Workers’ Compensation suggests
considering a vehicle to be the premises of the employer in difficult cases where
the employee is injured while entering or leaving the conveyance.99 Other courts
have followed this analogy and held a vehicle to be the premises of the employer
where an employee is injured while entering or leaving a vehicle controlled by
his or her employer.100 The majority of cases discussing this issue have focused
on injuries occurring as the employee was crossing a street before entering or
after leaving the vehicle.101 Additionally, some courts have considered instances
where the employee was injured while entering or leaving the vehicle itself.102
In Williams v. Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board (City of Philadelphia), an
employee suffered an injury when he hit his head on his employer’s van as he

96
See, e.g., Finley, 123 P.3d at 188–89 (“Presence on an employer’s premise is insufficient by
itself to establish the requisite nexus between the injury and employment.”); Haagensen v. State ex
rel. Wyo. Workers’ Comp. Div., 949 P.2d 865, 868–69 (Wyo. 1997) (“The requirement that the
injury ‘aris[e] out of and in the course of employment’ is premised upon a determination whether
the relationship between the injury and the employment is sufficient that the injury should be
compensable.”); Corean, 723 P.2d at 61 (“The causal nexus, not the premises, is the key.”).
97

See supra notes 93–96 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., Finley, 132 P.3d at 189; Murray v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety & Comp.
Div., 993 P.2d 327, 333 (Wyo. 1999); Haagensen, 949 P.2d at 867–868; Cabral v. Caspar Bldg. Sys.,
Inc., 920 P.2d 268, 271 (Wyo. 1996); Miller, 787 P.2d at 90; Archuleta, 787 P.2d at 94.
98

Larson, supra note 6, § 15.04 (“If one thinks of the employer’s truck as a floating fragment
of the premises, the analogy will supply answers in several familiar types of cases.”). See generally
Boulton, supra note 6, at 478 (citations omitted) (“The exceptions to the [going and coming] rule
‘extend the employer’s premises under certain circumstances when it would be unduly restrictive to
limit coverage of compensation statutes to the physical perimeters of the employer’s premises.’ These
circumstances included a worker provided with a company vehicle or required to have a vehicle to
perform the job.”).
99

100
See Williams v. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. (City of Philadelphia), 850 A.2d 37, 38 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2004); Blaustein v. Mitre Corp., 36 Va. App. 344, 352 n.2 (Va. Ct. App. 2001)
(citing Ferrara v. City of New Orleans, 100 So. 2d 896 (La. Ct. App. 1958); Gibbs v. Pizzolato, 67
So. 2d 139 (La. Ct. App. 1953)) (“By treating employer-provided transportation as an extension of
the employer’s premises, courts have extended the employer’s liability to employees boarding and
alighting from vehicles furnished by the employer.”).
101
Larson, supra note 6, § 15.04; see also In re Worker’s Comp. Claim of Barlow, 259 P.3d
1170, 1172–74 (Wyo. 2011) (citing Love v. BIPO, Inc., 146 P.3d 873 (Okla. Civ. App. 2006); State
Lottery Com. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)).
102

See Williams, 850 A.2d at 38; Blaustein, 36 Va. App. at 352 n.2.
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climbed into it.103 The court adopted the theory in Larson’s Workers’ Compensation
that a vehicle of the employer can be considered the premises of the employer
for the purposes of determining compensability, and thus, found the employee’s
injury compensable.104

Principal Case
James W. Barlow worked as a tool pusher on an oilrig in Pinedale, Wyoming.105
Barlow’s employer Grey Wolf Drilling, Inc. provided him with a 2005 Dodge
pickup truck for both his employment and personal use.106 Barlow’s employer
owned the vehicle.107 On December 1, 2008, Barlow was traveling from his home
in Powell, Wyoming to Casper, Wyoming for a series of meetings he was required
to attend as a condition of his employment.108 In anticipation of traveling to the
meetings, on November 30, 2008, Barlow loaded the pickup truck with clothing
and food.109 On the morning of December 1, 2008, while Barlow attempted to
enter the pickup truck his foot slipped and he hit his right knee on the stirrup.110
As per the WWCA Barlow was required to show that he suffered a
compensable “injury” as defined under section 27-14-102(a)(xi).111 The Wyoming
Workers’ Safety and Compensation Division determined Barlow did not suffer
a compensable injury under section 27-14-102(a)(xi) and denied Barlow any
benefits.112 The case was appealed to the OAH.113 The OAH granted summary
judgment in favor of the Wyoming Workers’ Safety and Compensation Division.114
The OAH held that “in order for there to be vehicle travel or transportation there
must be a [sic] least some initial movement by the vehicle in which the employee
is traveling as this is the most reasonable demarcation point between preparing

103

Williams, 850 A.2d at 38.

Id. at 38–40; Larson, supra note 6, § 15.04 (“The confusion that characterizes this class of
cases could be cleared up by forthrightly following the analogy of exceptions to the main premises
rule itself. If one thinks of the employer’s truck as a floating fragment of the premises, the analogy
will supply answers in several familiar types of case.”).
104

105
Brief of Appellant James W. Barlow at 2, In re Worker’s Comp. Claim of Barlow, 259 P.3d
1170 (Wyo. 2011) (No. S-10-0243) [hereinafter Brief of Appellant].
106

Id. at 4.

107

Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (“I mean, it’s the employer’s pickup . . . .”).

108

Id.

109

Id.

110

Id.

111

In re Worker’s Comp. Claim of Barlow, 259 P.3d 1170, 1172 (Wyo. 2011).

112

Brief of Appellee, supra note 15, at 2.

113

Id.

114

Id.
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for travel and actually traveling.”115 The district court affirmed the decision of the
OAH.116 Barlow appealed to the Wyoming Supreme Court.117

Majority Opinion
The majority determined that Barlow’s injuries were not compensable under
the WWCA.118 Justice Voigt, writing for the majority, first identified section
27-14-102(a)(xi)(D) as a codification of the long-standing common law going and
coming rule.119 The majority recognized the codification of the rule represents “a
legislative determination that, while no compensable nexus with the employment
is generally present when an employee is travelling between home and work, such
a nexus is created where the employer has assumed the cost of that travel.”120
Accordingly, the majority applied the conveyance exception to determine whether
Barlow’s injury was compensable.121
Both the Wyoming Workers’ Safety and Compensation Division and Barlow
relied on cases arising outside of Wyoming to support their arguments.122
However, the majority distinguished those cases by recognizing that they relied
on the common law going and coming rule, whereas Wyoming codified the
rule.123 Therefore, the majority reasoned that the application of the going and
coming rule should be reviewed under Wyoming’s statutory language instead of
the common law.124
The majority restated that the language section 27-14-102(a)(xi)(D) is
unambiguous.125 Nevertheless, the majority determined that it must interpret the

115

Brief of Appellant, supra note 105, at 20.

116

Brief of Appellee, supra note 15, at 2.

117

In re Worker’s Comp. Claim of Barlow, 259 P.3d 1170, 1172 (Wyo. 2011).

118

Id. at 1175.

119

Id. at 1173. Justice Voigt was joined by Justice Golden and Justice Hill. Id. at 1172.

Id. at 1173 (quoting Archuleta v. Carbon Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 787 P.2d 91, 93 (Wyo.
1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
120

121

Id.

122

Id.

Id. (“While all of the cases considered the ‘going and coming rule’ and the relevant
exception, the important difference between our case and the Oklahoma and California cases is that
those cases relied on the common law application of the rule, whereas Wyoming has codified the
rule and defined its application with specific statutory language.”).
123

Id. (“Therefore, to discern the proper application of the rule, as defined in our statute, we
must undertake a brief statutory analysis.”).
124

Id. at 1175 (citing Quinn v. Securitas Sec. Servs., 158 P.3d 711, 714 (Wyo. 2007); Berg v.
State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div., 106 P.3d 867, 871 (Wyo. 2005); Lloyd v. State ex
rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div., 93 P.3d 1001, 1004 (Wyo. 2004)).
125
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phrase “transported by the vehicle of the employer.”126 Citing one definition of
“transport,” the majority concluded the use of the term “leaves no doubt that an
injury sustained during travel is only compensable if it occurs as the claimant is
being carried or conveyed from one place to another.”127
Consequently, the majority concluded that entering the vehicle does not
entail transportation.128 Therefore, Barlow’s injuries were not compensable.129
The majority rejected Barlow’s argument that injuries suffered during preparation
for travel are compensable, stating that such an interpretation would require
adding terms not present in the statute.130 The majority held, “for an ‘injury
sustained during travel’ to be compensable, it must occur as the employee is being
‘transported by the vehicle of their employer.’ That is, the vehicle must be carrying
the employee from one place to another.”131 Thus, because Barlow was merely
entering the vehicle, he did not suffer a compensable injury under the WWCA.132

Dissenting Opinion
Justice Burke, writing for the dissent, disagreed with the majority’s framing
of the issue.133 The dissent also applied the conveyance exception, however, the
dissent argued that the issue presented in Barlow was not whether the injury
occurred while the employee was “transported” but whether the injury occurred
“during travel.”134 The dissent determined Barlow was “transported” by relying on
the facts that Barlow’s employer provided him with the truck and that Barlow was
subject to being called into work at any time.135 Therefore, the dissent concluded,
“[i]n light of these facts, the claimant has established that he was ‘transported by
a vehicle of the employer.’”136

126
Id. (“The compensability of the appellant’s injury hinges on the meaning of the word
‘transported.’”); cf. Justice Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation
of Legal Texts 53 (2012) (citations omitted) (“It is sometimes said that a plain text with a plain
meaning is simply applied and not ‘interpreted’ or ‘construed.’ Whether that is true is perhaps
a matter of definition. . . . Any meaning derived from signs involves interpretation, even if the
interpreter finds the task straightforward.”).
127

Barlow, 259 P.3d at 1175.

128

Id.

129

Id.

130

Id. (quoting Krenning v. Heart Mountain Irrigation Dist., 200 P.3d 774, 781 (Wyo. 2009)).

131

Id.

132

Id.

Id. at 1176 (Burke, J., dissenting). Justice Burke writing for the dissent was joined by
Justice Kite. Id.
133

134

Id.

135

Id.

136

Id.
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The dissent acknowledged that even at the administrative level the issue was
whether the injury occurred “during travel.” 137 Therefore, the dissent stated,
“[a]lthough the majority focuses upon the statutory phrase ‘is transported by,’
it appears that the majority would also interpret ‘during travel’ to require initial
movement of the vehicle in order for the injury to be compensable.” 138 The dissent
argued against that position by stating, “there is no indication in the statute that
the legislature intended to impose that limitation on compensability.” Instead the
dissent argued that from a common sense perspective, one must enter a vehicle
before one can travel in it.139 Therefore, if an employee is entering a vehicle for
the purposes of employment then injuries suffered when entering should be
compensable.140 Barlow was entering the vehicle when he suffered his injury,
and thus he was injured “during travel” while being “transported by a vehicle of
his employer.”141
Furthermore, the dissent contended that the confusion of applying the
conveyance exception could have been avoided by applying the Wyoming
Supreme Court’s causal nexus test.142 The dissent stated:
Rather than deciding these cases based on a finely drawn rule,
it is better to approach each individual set of facts in light of
the “causal nexus” standard that we have previously articulated.
In interpreting the definition of injury under Wyo. Stat. Ann.
§ 27-14-102(a)(xi), we have repeatedly stated that, for an injury
to be compensable, “there must be ‘a causal nexus between the
injury and some condition, activity, environment or requirement
of the employment.’”143
The dissent argued that the application of the causal nexus test would have
resolved the present case without creating a new bright line rule.144 Arguing
against creating a new bright line rule, the dissent stated, “[i]t is simply impossible
to anticipate all of the potential ways in which an employee could be injured

Id. (“The hearing examiner, correctly determining that ‘the dispositive legal issue is whether
or not any injury [the claimant] sustained was, as a matter of law, sustained “during travel,”’ referred
to the definition of travel contained in Black’s Law Dictionary.”).
137

138

Id.

139

Id.

140

Id.

141

Id.

142

Id.

Id. (quoting Shelest v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div., 222 P.3d 167, 170
(Wyo. 2010)).
143

144

Id.
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‘during travel.’”145 Accordingly, the causal nexus test provides an equitable test for
determining when an injury is compensable under the WWCA.146 The dissent
argued that the injuries suffered by Barlow satisfied the causal nexus test.147
Barlow was climbing into the vehicle on his way to a work related matter when he
suffered his injury.148 He had no alternative means of entering the vehicle other
than opening the door and using the stirrup.149 His employment required him to
use the vehicle for travel.150 Therefore, according to the dissent, the injury suffered
by Barlow was directly related to his employment and his injury was compensable
under the WWCA.151

Analysis
Barlow was decided incorrectly for three reasons. First, the majority’s holding
in Barlow will likely exclude compensation for injuries that should otherwise be
compensable under the conveyance exception.152 For example, injuries suffered
during travel but while stopped would arguably not be compensable under the
holding in Barlow.153 Second, the court could have applied the reimbursement
exception.154 Specifically, Barlow’s injuries could have been found compensable
under the reimbursement exception because he was reimbursed for his travel
expenses.155 Finally, the premises could be extended to cover a vehicle of the
employer.156 Accordingly, the majority’s holding in Barlow should be revisited.

Excluding Compensable Injuries Under The Conveyance Exception
In Barlow, the majority created a bright line rule for distinguishing between
compensable and non-compensable injuries under the conveyance exception,
holding that in order for the “is transported by” element to be satisfied the vehicle

145

Id.

146

Id. at 1177.

147

Id.

148

Id.

149

Id.

150

Id.

151

Id.

152

See infra notes 157–85 and accompanying text.

153

See infra notes 157–85 and accompanying text.

154

See infra notes 186–203 and accompanying text.

155

See infra notes 186–203 and accompanying text.

156

See infra notes 204– 41 and accompanying text.
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must be moving.157 However, as noted in Larson’s Workers’ Compensation: “When
a line of this kind is drawn, there are always cases very close to each side of the
line.” 158 The bright line drawn by the majority in Barlow leads to an absurd
result by excluding what should be compensable injuries under the conveyance exception.
The statutory phrases “is transported by” and “during travel” are arguably
ambiguous. Under Wyoming law, “[a] statute is clear and unambiguous if its
wording is such that reasonable persons are able to agree on its meaning with
consistency and predictability. Conversely, a statute is ambiguous if it is found
to be vague or uncertain and subject to varying interpretations.”159 Furthermore,
the Wyoming Supreme Court has “recognized that divergent opinions among
parties as to the meaning of a statute may be evidence of ambiguity but is
not conclusive.”160 In Barlow, the majority cited the holding in Lloyd that the
language of section 27-14-102(a)(xi)(D) is unambiguous.161 However, the
majority’s reliance on Lloyd and its progeny is misguided.162 Lloyd did not stand
for the proposition that all words and phrases in section 27-14-102(a)(xi)(D) are
unambiguous.163 Rather, Lloyd stood for the proposition that section 27-14-102(a)
(xi)(D) unambiguously abrogated the common law exceptions to the going and
coming rule.164 Furthermore, two Wyoming cases subsequent to Lloyd determined
that the language of section 27-14-102(a)(xi)(D) was unambiguous; however
those cases did not address the statutory phrases “is transported by” or “during
travel.”165 In Berg, the Wyoming Supreme Court applied the reimbursement

157
In re Worker’s Comp. Claim of Barlow, 259 P.3d 1170, 1175 (“We conclude the language
of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27–14–102(a)(xi)(D) plainly and unambiguously requires that for an ‘injury
sustained during travel’ to be compensable, it must occur as the employee is being ‘transported by
the vehicle of their employer.’ That is, the vehicle must be carrying the employee from one place
to another.”).

Larson, supra note 6 (discussing the basic going and coming rule); see also Barlow, 259 P.3d
at 1176 (Burke, J., dissenting) (“It is simply impossible to anticipate all of the potential ways in
which an employee could be injured ‘during travel.’”).
158

159
Office of State Lands & Invs. v. Mule Shoe Ranch, Inc., 252 P.3d 951, 955 (Wyo. 2011)
(quoting Dorr v. Smith, Keller & Assocs., 238 P.3d 549, 552 (Wyo. 2010)). See generally Person,
supra note 57, at 565–66.
160
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Dep’t. of Revenue, 154 P.3d 331, 335 (Wyo. 2007) (quoting RME
Petroleum Co. v. Wyo. Dep’t of Revenue, 150 P.3d 673, 683–84 (Wyo. 2007)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
161
Barlow, 259 P.3d at 1173 (citing Lloyd v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div.,
93 P.3d 1001, 1004 (Wyo. 2004)).
162

See infra notes 161–67 and accompanying text.

163

See supra notes 62–66 and accompanying text.

164

See supra notes 62–66 and accompanying text.

See Quinn v. Securitas Sec. Servs., 158 P.3d 711, 714 (Wyo. 2007); Berg v. State ex rel.
Wyo. Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div., 106 P.3d 867, 871 (Wyo. 2005).
165
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exception.166 In Quinn, the Wyoming Supreme Court applied the phrase “vehicle
of the employer.”167 Accordingly, the Wyoming Supreme Court was not bound
by its precedent to determine that the statutory phrases “is transported by” and
“during travel” were unambiguous.
The statutory phrases “is transported by” and “during travel” are subject to
varying reasonable interpretations. As stated, disagreement among parties as to a
statute’s interpretation does not necessarily make it ambiguous, but is evidence
of ambiguity.168 At the administrative level, the hearing examiner interpreted the
phrase “during travel” to require at least some initial movement.169 Barlow argued
that the phrase “during travel” should include activities related to preparation
for travel.170
On the other hand, the Wyoming Workers’ Safety and Compensation
Division argued that the plain language of the phrase “mandates that a workers’
compensation claimant be moving, journeying, or going somewhere in order for
benefits to be awarded.”171 Finally, the dissent in Barlow argued that the phrase
“during travel” should be viewed from a common sense perspective.172 The dissent
stated, “[f ]rom a common sense perspective it is obvious that an individual must
enter the vehicle to travel in it.”173 Furthermore, in Barlow the majority determined
that the phrase “is transported by” “leaves no doubt that an injury sustained
during travel is only compensable if it occurs as the claimant is being carried or
conveyed from one place to another (i.e. sitting in the vehicle and moving from
one place to another).”174 Conversely, the dissent concluded, “[t]he statute does
not require that the injury occur simultaneously with ‘being transported,’ just as it
does not require that the injury occur while the employee is ‘being reimbursed’ for
travel expenses.”175 Although divergent opinions among parties is not conclusive
evidence of ambiguity, the amount of disagreement relating to the phrases “is
transported by” and “during travel” is arguably sufficient to override the sweeping

166

See supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text.

167

See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text.

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Dep’t. of Revenue, 154 P.3d 331, 335 (Wyo. 2007) (citing RME
Petroleum Co. v. Wyo. Dep’t of Revenue, 150 P.3d 673, 683–84 (Wyo. 2007)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
168

169

See Brief of Appellant, supra note 105, at 23.

170

Id.

171

Brief of Appellee, supra note 15, at 14.

In re Worker’s Comp. Claim of Barlow, 259 P.3d 1170, 1176 (Burke, J., dissenting)
(Wyo. 2011).
172

173

Id.

174

Id. at 1175 (majority opinion).

175

Id. at 1176 (Burke, J., dissenting).
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statement that the language of section 27-14-102(a)(xi)(D) is unambiguous.176
Accordingly, the rules of statutory construction should be applied to the statutory
phrases “is transported by” and “during travel.”
Under Wyoming law, an interpretation of a statute that leads to an absurd
result will not be followed.177 The holding in Barlow leads to an absurd result by
denying compensation for injuries that would probably be compensable under
the conveyance exception.178 Barlow requires, “for an ‘injury sustained during
travel’ to be compensable, it must occur as the employee is being ‘transported by
the vehicle of their employer.’ That is, the vehicle must be carrying the employee
from one place to another.”179 An employee who is not currently inside of the
vehicle is not being carried from one place to another. Therefore, an employee
who is injured outside of the vehicle, no matter the surrounding circumstances,
would not have suffered a compensable injury under the majority’s interpretation
of the conveyance exception.180
Consider the application of the holding in Barlow to the following hypothetical
situation: imagine an employee was provided with a pickup truck to travel to
distant meetings but was not compensated in any fashion for the travel. Suppose
the employee had successfully entered the pickup truck and begun movement
towards the distant meetings. Assume the meetings were some great distance
from the employee’s home, and consequently, the employee had to stop and
refuel. To refuel a vehicle, a person must exit the vehicle. During refueling a static
spark ignited a fire and, as a result of the fire, the employee suffered catastrophic
burns.181 Applying the majority’s bright line rule to the hypothetical situation
would deny compensation and reveals that the rule leads to absurd results by
denying compensation for injuries that would probably be compensable under
the conveyance exception.
The dissent’s interpretation of the conveyance exception avoids the absurd
result created by the majority’s holding. The dissent argued that the better
approach to applying the conveyance exception is using the court’s causal

176

See supra notes 168–75 and accompanying text.

Office of State Lands & Invs. v. Mule Shoe Ranch, Inc., 252 P.3d 951, 956 (Wyo. 2011)
(citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 154 P.3d 331, 332 (Wyo. 2007)) (“We will not
construe statutory language to reach an absurd result.”).
177

178

See infra notes 179–81 and accompanying text.

179

Barlow, 259 P.3d at 1175.

See id. at 1176 (Burke, J., dissenting) (“Certainly, the employee could be injured while the
vehicle is moving, but an employee could also be injured while the vehicle is not in motion.”).
180

See, e.g., Perkins v. Wurster Oil Corp., 886 So. 2d 1229, 1231 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (“Fred
Perkins stopped at a gas station to fill his truck. While the process was ongoing, static electricity
ignited the fuel vapors. Mr. Perkins was burned by the fire.”).
181
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nexus test.182 Under the dissent’s articulation of the causal nexus test, “for an
injury to be compensable, ‘there must be a causal nexus between the injury and
some condition, activity, environment or requirement of the employment.’”183
Refueling is causally connected to traveling. In this case, Barlow had to travel
approximately 235 miles.184 Therefore, he would likely have had to refuel and
that refueling would have been causally connected to the requirements of his
employment. So long as Barlow was furthering the interests of his employer when
he suffered his injury, then the injury should have satisfied the elements of the
conveyance exception.185 Accordingly, if Barlow could also establish the elements
of a compensable injury then his injury should have been compensable under
the conveyance exception. Therefore, to avoid an absurd result, the majority’s
bright line rule should be rejected in favor of applying the causal nexus test as the
dissent urged.

Applying the Reimbursement Exception
Although in Barlow the majority and the dissent only applied the con
veyance exception, Barlow’s injury could also have been considered under the
reimbursement exception.186 While the language of section 27-14-102(a)(xi)(D)
creates two express exceptions, the majority erroneously determined that only the
conveyance exception was at issue in Barlow.187 Neither Barlow nor the Wyoming
Workers’ Safety and Compensation Division argued for or against the application
of the reimbursement exception; however, the reimbursement exception could
have applied to Barlow’s injury.
There are two elements to the reimbursement exception as codified under
Wyoming law.188 First, the injury must occur “during travel.”189 Second, the
182
Barlow, 259 P.3d at 1176–77 (Burke, J., dissenting) (“Rather than deciding these cases
based on a finely drawn rule, it is better to approach each individual set of facts in light of the ‘causal
nexus’ standard that we have previously articulated.”).
183
Id. (quoting Shelest v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div., 222 P.3d 167, 170
(Wyo. 2010)).
184

Id.

See id. (“So long as the employee was entering the vehicle in furtherance of the employment,
there is no reason to deny recovery.”).
185

186

See id. at 1174–78 (majority opinion and opinion of Burke, J., dissenting).

187

Id. at 1174–75 (majority opinion).

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(D) (2012) (“reimbursed for travel expenses”); e.g.,
Berg v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div., 106 P.3d 867, 871 (Wyo. 2005); Archuleta
v. Carbon Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 787 P.2d 91, 92 (Wyo. 1990); Claims of Naylor, 723 P.2d 1237,
1241 (Wyo. 1986).
188

189
See § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(D). Although the phrase “during travel” refers to the going
and coming rule itself, it would be improper to exclude the phrase from a consideration of the
reimbursement exception. If an injury occurs while an employee is not currently traveling but is
reimbursed for travel generally then the reimbursement exception would not apply. Therefore, for
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employee must be “reimbursed for travel expenses.”190 The causal nexus test can
be applied to both elements of the reimbursement exception.191 Additionally, an
injured employee must also establish the elements of a compensable injury in
order to receive compensation under the reimbursement exception.192
The first element of the reimbursement exception is satisfied by the facts of
Barlow. Although the majority created a bright line rule for determining when
an employee is “transported,” the court did not rule on the issue of “during
travel.”193 In this case, Barlow was required to travel to distant meetings as part of
his employment.194 Barlow’s injuries occurred as he was climbing into the truck to
travel to the meetings.195 As the dissent aptly noted, “it is obvious that an individual
must enter the vehicle to travel in it.”196 Accordingly, a causal connection existed
between Barlow’s injury and his employment.197 Therefore, Barlow’s injury did
occur “during travel.”
The second element of the reimbursement exception is also satisfied by the
facts of Barlow.198 Although this area of law in Wyoming is not well developed,
in other jurisdictions providing an employee control over a vehicle to be used
for the employment constitutes payment for travel expenses.199 Another factor to

an injury to be compensable under the reimbursement exception it must occur “during travel” and
the employee must be “reimbursed for that travel.” See, e.g., Berg, 106 P.3d at 871 (emphasis added)
(“Subsection (D) is the codification of ‘a long-standing common law rule that injuries incurred
while either going to or coming from work are not compensable unless the employer . . . has reimbursed
him for the costs of those travels.”); Barlow, 259 P.3d at 1176 (Burke, J., dissenting) (“The question
we must answer, then, is whether the claimant’s injury was sustained ‘during travel.’).
190

See § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(D).

E.g., Berg, 106 P.3d at 871; Archuleta, 787 P.2d at 92 (“Thus, in terms of our ‘nexus test,’
that provision constitutes a legislative determination that, while no compensable nexus with the
employment is generally present when an employee is traveling between home and work, such a
nexus is created where the employer has assumed the cost of that travel.”).
191

192

See supra text accompanying notes 87–88.

See Barlow, 259 P.3d at 1174–75 (“The compensability of the appellant’s injury hinges on
the meaning of the word ‘transported.’”).
193

194

Brief of Appellant, supra note 105, at 2, 4.

195

Id. at 2.

196

Barlow, 259 P.3d at 1177 (Burke, J., dissenting).

197

See supra notes 188–96 and accompanying text.

See Quinn v. Securitas Sec. Servs., 158 P.3d 711, 714 (Wyo. 2007) (“Those exceptions find
a causal nexus where the employer has in some fashion provided the employee with transportation
or has reimbursed him for the costs of those travels.”).
198

Larson, supra note 6, § 14.07[1] (citations omitted) (“However, in the majority of cases
involving . . . the provision of an automobile under the employee’s control, the journey is held to be
in the course of employment.”).
199
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consider is the length of the journey itself.200 In this case, Barlow was provided a
pickup truck to be used for personal and employment related uses.201 On the day
he suffered his injury Barlow was entering the pickup truck to travel to meetings
that were approximately 235 miles away as a requirement of his employment.202
Accordingly, there existed a nexus between the injury Barlow suffered and the
payment for travel expenses.203 Thus, Barlow’s injury could have satisfied the
elements of the reimbursement exception. If Barlow could establish the elements
of a compensable injury then his injury should have been compensable under the
reimbursement exception to the WWCA.

Extending Premises to Include a Vehicle of the Employer
Barlow’s injury could also have been compensable as an injury occurring
on the premises of his employer.204 If an injury occurs on the premises of an
employer then the going and coming rule does not apply.205 While the Wyoming
Supreme Court has never ruled on the issue, other courts have determined a
vehicle to be the premises of the employer.206 In Williams v. Worker’s Compensation
Appeal Board (City of Philadelphia), the court held that an employee, who suffered
an injury when he hit his head as he entered a van of his employer, suffered a
compensable injury because the van was a portion of the employer’s premises.207
Similarly, Barlow was injured while entering a vehicle.208 Barlow’s employer
“provided him with a truck to use for his work.”209 Barlow’s employer owned
the vehicle.210 Barlow’s employer exercised control over the vehicle by requiring
his use of the vehicle to travel to distant meetings.211 Accordingly, the truck can
properly be considered the premises of the employer.
Id. (“[W]hen the subject of the transportation is singled out for special consideration it is
normally because the transportation involves a considerable distance, and therefore qualified under
the rule herein suggested: that employment should be deemed to include the travel when the travel
itself is a substantial part of the service performed.”).
200

201

Barlow, 259 P.3d at 1172.

202

Id.

See Shelest v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div., 222 P.3d 167, 170 (Wyo.
2010) (quoting Quinn v. Securitas Sec. Servs., 158 P.3d 711, 714 (Wyo. 2007); In re Willey, 571
P.2d 248, 250 (Wyo. 1977)).
203

204

See infra notes 204–211 and accompanying text.

205

See supra notes 93–97 and accompanying text.

206

See supra notes 98–104 and accompanying text.

Williams v. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. (City of Philadelphia), 850 A.2d 37, 38–40 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2004).
207

208

Brief of Appellant, supra note 105, at 4.

209

In re Worker’s Comp. Claim of Barlow, 259 P.3d 1170, 1176 (Wyo. 2011).

Brief of Appellant, supra note 105, at 15–16 (internal citations omitted) (“I mean, it’s the
employer’s pickup . . . .”).
210

211
See id. at 4, 16 (“It was the vehicle provided to him by his employer and the one, supposedly,
that he had to use.”).
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Moreover, in order to receive compensation for an injury occurring on the
premises of his employer an employee must establish all of the statutory elements
of the “injury rule.”212 Under the injury rule, an employee must show that he
suffered a “harmful change in the human organism.”213 Barlow suffered an injury
to his knee, satisfying the first element.214 The second element of the injury rule
requires that the injury occur “while at work.”215 Here, Barlow’s employment
required him to travel to distant meetings.216 Barlow was entering the vehicle to
travel to the distant meetings when he suffered his injury.217 Thus, Barlow was
injured “while at work.”218 Accordingly, the second element of the injury rule is
satisfied by the facts of Barlow.
In addition, the third element requires that the place be “used or controlled
by the employer.”219 Barlow’s employer owned the vehicle and exercised control
by requiring his use of the vehicle.220 The vehicle may properly be considered the
premises of his employer.221 Therefore, the third element is satisfied. The fourth
element of the injury rule requires that an injury must occur “in or about the
premises occupied.”222 Barlow slipped while climbing into the truck, hitting his
knee on the stirrup.223 If the truck is considered the premises of his employer then
his injury occurred in or about the premises.224 Thus, the injury occurred “in
or about the premises occupied” and the element is satisfied. To satisfy the fifth
element an injury must occur “in places where the employer’s business requires
an employee’s presence.”225 Here, Barlow was required to travel to a series of
meetings as part of his employment.226 Barlow had to use the vehicle to travel to
the meetings.227 Accordingly, the fifth element of the injury rule is satisfied by the
facts of Barlow.

212

See supra notes 28–39 and accompanying text.

213

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi) (2012).

214

Brief of Appellant, supra note 105, at 4.

215

See § 27-14-102(a)(xi).

216

Brief of Appellant, supra note 105, at 4.

217

Id.

218

See § 27-14-102(a)(xi).

219

Id. § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(D).

220

See Brief of Appellant, supra note 105, at 15–16.

221

See supra notes 204–11 and accompanying text.

222

See § 27-14-102(a)(xi).

223

Brief of Appellant, supra note 105, at 4.

224

See id.

225

See § 27-14-102(a)(xi).

226

Brief of Appellant, supra note 105, at 4.

227

Id.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2013

25

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 13 [2013], No. 1, Art. 4

146

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 13

The sixth element requires that the employment “subjects the employee to
the extrahazardous duties incident to the business.”228 The employment need not
necessarily be extrahazardous if the employer has elected to obtain coverage under
the WWCA.229 It is unclear whether Barlow’s employment was extrahazardous
or whether Barlow’s employer elected coverage, but Barlow’s employment was
covered by the WWCA.230 Accordingly, the proper inquiry under the sixth element
is whether Barlow was subject to the duties incident to the business.231 Barlow
was required to travel to the distant meetings by use of his employer-provided
truck.232 Thus, Barlow was subject to the duties incident to the business.
The final element of the injury rule requires the injury “aris[e] out of and
in the course of employment.”233 The final element prompts the application of
the causal nexus test, which requires that “there must be a causal nexus between
the injury and some condition, activity, environment or requirement of the
employment.”234 The final element is generally the most dispositive.235 Here,
Barlow was entering the vehicle of his employer to travel to a work related matter
when he suffered an injury to his knee.236 Barlow had no choice but to enter the
vehicle in order to travel to the meetings.237 Accordingly, his injury was causally
connected to a requirement of his employment and the final element is satisfied.238

228

See § 27-14-102(a)(xi).

Id. § 27-14-108(j) (“Any employee not enumerated under subsections (a) through (g) of
this section or not employed in an extrahazardous employment enumerated under this section
may be covered and subject to the provisions of this act and his employment shall be treated as if
extrahazardous for purposes of this act, if his employer elects to obtain coverage under this act and
makes payments as required by this act.”).
229

See In re Worker’s Comp. Claim of Barlow, 259 P.3d 1170, 1170 (Wyo. 2012); Brief of
Appellant, supra note 105, at 1–24; Brief of Appellee, supra note 15, at 2–18; see also § 27-14-108
(defining extrahazardous employment and optional coverage under the WWCA). Presumably, if
Barlow’s employment was not covered under the WWCA then that issue would have been litigated.
See Barlow, 259 P.3d at 1170; see, e.g., Araguz v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div.,
262 P.3d 1263, 1268 (Wyo. 2011) (“Because Wal–Mart is not engaged in extrahazardous business
activities and did not elect to contribute to the state workers› compensation fund, the appellants are
not entitled to benefits.”).
230

231

See § 27-14-102(a)(xi).

232

Brief of Appellant, supra note 105, at 4.

233

See § 27-14-102(a)(xi).

Barlow, 259 P.3d at 1176–77 (Wyo. 2011) (Burke, J., dissenting) (quoting Shelest v. State
ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div. 222 P.3d 167, 170 (Wyo. 2010)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
234

235

See supra notes 94–97 and accompanying text.

236

Brief of Appellant, supra note 105, at 4.

237

Id.

See also Barlow, 259 P.3d at 1175 (Burke, J., dissenting) (“I conclude . . . that the claimant
has satisfied the general test for compensability by establishing a ‘causal nexus’ between the injury
and his employment.”).
238
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Therefore, Barlow’s injury could have been compensable under the injury rule if
the Wyoming Supreme Court holds that a vehicle controlled by the employer is
the premises of the employer.
Extending the injury rule to include a vehicle of the employer would help
resolve the worry that a broad reading of the conveyance or reimbursement
exceptions might cover injuries that should not be compensable.239 In order for
an injury to be compensable under the injury rule, the injury must occur “in or
about the premises occupied, used or controlled by the employer.”240 Therefore,
extending premises to include a vehicle of the employer would probably not cover
situations where an employee is injured while crossing the street or leaving his
house in the morning to get to the vehicle.241 Under this narrow reading of the
injury rule, only injuries occurring on the premises of the employer would be
compensable. Accordingly, the injury rule could be extended to hold that injuries
are compensable if the injuries occur on a vehicle of the employer.

Conclusion
Those employees who suffer injuries while entering a vehicle of their
employer or who suffer injures while entering a vehicle and are reimbursed
for travel expenses should be compensated under the WWCA. In Barlow, the
majority of the Wyoming Supreme Court created a bright line rule that denies
compensation for compensable injuries that should otherwise be compensable
under the conveyance exception.242 Even if the conveyance exception does not
apply to the facts of Barlow, then compensation could have been awarded under
the reimbursement exception.243 Finally, the court should hold that a vehicle of
the employer is the premises of the employer for purposes of injuries occurring
on the premises of the employer.244 By drawing an untenable line to determine
compensation for injuries suffered as an employee is entering a vehicle of the
employer, the Wyoming Supreme Court reached an incorrect conclusion.

239
See id. at 1175 (majority opinion) (“[T]here is simply no room for the notion that injuries
suffered while ‘preparing to travel,’ or that all injuries suffered while doing any activity tangentially
related to any travel ‘necessary to employment,’ are compensable.”); Larson, supra note 6, § 15.04
(“[I]t would be undesirable to start the dangerous and unending game of fixing a ‘reasonable
distance’ to which protection is extended.”).
240

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi) (2012).

See Barlow, 259 P.3d at 1173–74 (discussing cases where an employee was injured while
crossing the street to get to a vehicle); Larson, supra note 6, § 15.04 (“However, when the employee
approaches the truck from home in the morning, or leaves the truck at night, the analogy just
invoked does not apply.”).
241

242

See supra notes 157–85 and accompanying text.

243

See supra notes 186–203 and accompanying text.

244

See supra notes 204–41 and accompanying text.
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